Abstract
Introduction
Shortly after the agreement on most of the elements of Banking Union, the European Commission embarked on a new project, 'Capital Markets Union' (CMU). The stated objectives of CMU were 'to create deeper and more integrated capital markets' in the 28 member states of the European Union (EU) and to expand the 'non-bank part of Europe's financial system' (Véron 2014: 1). CMU is important economically and politically for several inter-related reasons. CMU was intended to advance the single market in finance, to revamp credit growth in the EU after the crisis, to 'counter-balance' Banking Union (especially in the eyes of euro area outsiders, notably the UK) and to further the completion of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). CMU could potentially diminish the reliance on predominantly bank-based sources of funding for the real economy in the EU. CMU is officially about the liberalisation and opening up of national financial systems, which are one important element of national varieties of capitalism. CMU is thus an important project for both policy-makers but also for academics working on European market integration -it is about the future development of the single market and national markets. After Banking Union, CMU was first narrative centred upon boosting the size and the internal and external competitiveness of EU capital markets. The Commission directed this narrative above all at the British government (aligned largely with the City of London), and the financial industry in a number of EU member states and specifically large cross-border banks. The second Commission narrative focused upon the provision of increased funding to the real economy, especially to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructural projects. This narrative was instrumental in order to mobilise the support of most continental member states and notably in the EU periphery. In wielding both narratives, the Commission portrayed CMU as a positive sum (win-win) game that benefitted everyone -rather than as a project generating potential winners and losers -thus reducing potential opposition to it. The Commission's narrative of 'everyone is a winner' sought to blur the potential political economy effects of capital market liberalisation.
This article is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on ideas in analysing EU public policies and outlines our core argument that informs the analysis of the subsequent empirical sections. We then discuss the pivotal role of the Commission in the development of the CMU project and examine the political economy of CMU. The penultimate section presents the two main narratives articulated by the European Commission in order to mobilise the political support necessary to push forward CMU.
Ideas and actor-centred constructivism in EU public policies
Over the last thirty years or so, there has been a burgeoning constructivist research agenda in the study of EU public policy (for a comprehensive discussion, see Saurugger 2013) . 'Actorcentred constructivism' has been particularly prominent in the field of European political economy 1 as it considers not only ideas, but also actors, interests and power, thus addressing some traditional critiques of constructivism (Saurugger 2013: 897) . A variety of ideas-based approaches can be subsumed under the label of actor-centred constructivism: 'policy learning' (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013) , 'policy framing' (Surel 2000) , 'advocacy coalition' (Sabatier 1998) , 'discursive institutionalism' (Schmidt 2008) , and 'strategic constructivism' (Jabko 2006 (Jabko , 1999 . A vast array of related concepts has been deployed in order to examine EU public policies, notably: 'policy paradigms' concerning macroeconomic policies (McNamara 1998) and financial regulation (Mügge 2011; Quaglia 2010) ; 'policy narratives' concerning taxation (Radaelli 1999) ; 'discursive constructions' on 'globalisation' (Hay and Rosamond 2002). Schmidt (2008) distinguishes between the 'coordinative' discourse that takes place amongst policy-makers and the 'communicative' discourse of policy-makers who present policy programmes to the general public. Recent research has specifically explored the link between 'ideas' and 'power', discussing 'power in, over and through' ideas (Carstensen and Schmidt 2015: 318) .
Here, we are particularly interested in a 'strategic' form of actor-centred constructivism, whereby ideas are deliberately promoted, kept off the agenda, or strategically used by actors in order to frame (or re-frame) interests, form supporting coalitions, and prevent opposition to certain projects. For example, Jabko (2006) analyses how the European Commission manipulated the idea of the 'market' in various ways in order to build coalitions in favour of the construction of the Single Market. He also highlights the specific 'logics' deployed by the Commission in order promote EMU (Jabko 1999) . Radaelli (1999) traces how the 'narrative' of 'harmful tax competition' was purposefully deployed by the Commission in the field of taxation policy, traditionally the realm of the member states.
Actors (especially, the Commission) are likely to deploy ideas strategically in order to frame (or reframe) interests, if the proposed project is likely to meet some opposition amongst or within EU member states. In turn, this is more likely to happen in the case of economic policies, where there are entrenched interests at stake and (self-)perceived winners and losers.
For example, over the previous two decades, national governments had repeatedly been keen to agree EU-level regulation that was most advantageous for their national financial systems, which frequently produced deadlock in negotiations (Mügge 2010; Quaglia 2010) . In the construction of CMU, conflicting financial interests are at stake, which reflect the different configuration of national financial sectors and their link to the real economy (see , as explained in the empirical analysis below. In order to side-step opposition from potential losers and avoid policy deadlocks, agents can develop policy narratives, which are causal stories relevant to policy-making (Radaelli 1999) and which are instrumental in mobilising support for a given project by framing it in a certain way. Often one prevailing policy narrative, such as that of 'harmful tax competition' (Radaelli 1999 ) is deployed for persuasive purposes. Less frequently, parallel narratives are used to speak to different audiences and frame a certain policy project as a positive sum game, not as a competitive zero-sum game with winners and losers.
With reference to CMU, power dynamics alone cannot account for the launch of the project and the shape it took. It is true that -as explained in Section 4 below -there were a set of actors with strong interests in CMU, notably large universal banks, the City of London and the UK authorities; and a rather loose coalition of less enthusiastic actors, mainly smaller traditional banks, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, and governments in Southern and
Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, the first set of actors had been mostly on the losing side when EU market-shaping financial regulation was adopted post crisis. Moreover, the second set of actors were more numerous, albeit less well-organised. One could argue that the 'vagueness' of what was meant by CMU contributed to increase support and lessen
opposition. Yet, the under-specified nature of CMU was (partly) a result of how this policy initiative was framed by the Commission.
We argue that the Commission's policy narratives were instrumental in constructing the benefits of CMU for these different players in order to push the project forward. In order to develop this argument, we first examine the empirical record of the development of CMU looking for evidence that the Commission was the leading institutional promoter of CMU.
We then examine the political economy of CMU. Finally, we tease out the main elements of the Commission's narratives by examining the key CMU-related documents and speeches in Brussels launching them because these -by virtue of their wider audience -contain both policy narratives. We then focus on all the speeches, print interviews and written articles that However, the Commission had considerable room for manoeuvre at the agenda-setting stage to develop what was meant by CMU and its priorities. This was crucial in shaping the subsequent development of the project and the legislative and non-legislative measures adopted. The Commission was keen to promote CMU for its 'intrinsic' merits (as detailed in many Commission's documents), but also as a way to relaunch financial integration in
Europe. There was also a political motivation related to the referendum on Brexit, in that CMU was a project that would greatly benefit the City of London and would therefore attract the support of the British authorities (Ringe 2015) , as explained in the following section.
The political economy of CMU: potential winners and losers
CMU -especially if all its main elements are eventually adopted -would have competitive implications for much of the financial sector and for member states. In other words, CMU would likely generate winners and losers or, at the very least, some players would benefit more than others (for a detailed analysis, see Quaglia et al. 2016) . The underlying political economy conflict concerning CMU was both at the level of economic interests (different financial firms) and member states (with differently configured financial systems and economies). At the level of economic interests, CMU potentially created an advantage for non-bank financial firms and larger universal banks which had the resources to engage in non-traditional banking activities (including securitisation, see Gabor 2015). More traditional and often smaller banks that were less engaged in capital markets and securitisation were potentially disadvantaged. CMU was explicitly about increasing the choices available to nonfinancial companies (notably SMEs) in need of external funding -beyond bank credit.
At the level of conflict among member states, CMU promoted the opening up of national financial systems: their diversification and, inevitably, denationalisation. The large majority of EU member states had financial systems overwhelmingly dominated by banks, providing the bulk of external funding to non-financial firms. Several West European financial systems -notably, the German, French, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and Swedish -also had financial systems dominated overwhelmingly by nationally-owned banks. Thus, CMU represented a potentially significant force for change both in economic but also in political terms, given the political significance of national bank champions in a number of EU member states (Epstein 2017).
Only a small number of member states -notably the United Kingdom and Luxembourghad diverse financial systems where more than a third of financial assets were held by financial institutions other than banks. Furthermore, only in the UK did non-financial company external funding extend significantly beyond bank credit for more than the largest national companies. Member states in which smaller and/or more traditional banks formed a larger part of the banking system (notably Germany, but also Italy and Austria) were those in which the national authorities were more likely to be influenced by the interests of small banks and were more likely to express caution on CMU. We elaborate these points by looking at the 'revealed' preferences of national policy actors -mainly economic interests and public authorities -as expressed in their responses to the Commission consultations and press coverage. These preferences also correspond closely to our expectations, given the business models of these economic interests and their positions within national financial systems and economies.
The main potential winners of CMU were likely to be the most competitive parts of the The proposed revision of the Solvency II Directive -de facto reducing capital requirements for insurers for investments in long term infrastructural projects -would most likely benefit large insurers that were more likely to invest in such projects. The revision of the Prospectus market legislation and ease cross-border activities would be particularly advantageous for the largest, most competitive financial centres -first and foremost the City of London -that would be able to attract more business from around the EU. Other potential beneficiaries of CMU could be SMEs, start-ups, and infrastructural projects. However, the causal chain of effects for these potential beneficiaries was longer than for the first set of immediate winners in the financial sector, and mostly rested on the (uncertain) assumption that additional funding raised on capital markets would reach SMEs, start-ups and infrastructural companies. 2) stated that CMU should not be allowed to harm the 'healthy competition between financial centres'. The Italian government (2015: 2) warned that 'capital will tend to flow to those areas and sectors in the EU, where risk-adjusted returns tend to be higher … magnifying distortions and unlevelled competitive conditions across Member States in the Single Market'.
The Commission's policy narratives on CMU
In the design and construction of CMU, the Commission used two main policy narratives, which were supposed to mobilise the potential winners and to appease the potential losers, or those who perceived themselves as benefitting relatively less from CMU. In order to secure political support for the project from a variety of constituencies, the Commission had to speak to and target its message to different audiences. The Commission articulated the first narrative which focused upon boosting the size, the competitiveness and the openness of EU capital markets. With this narrative, the Commission mainly targeted the UK, the City of London, large cross-border universal banks and other international financial players. The
Commission's second narrative concerned the provision of (non-bank) funding to the real economy, which mainly targeted continental countries and notably countries in the EU periphery, as well as domestically oriented banks and smaller capital markets. Crucially, we have gathered evidence of considerable shifts in the policy narratives adopted by the leading Commission official responsible for promoting the CMU project -depending on the audience addressed.
The policy narrative on boosting EU capital markets and financial centres
The first policy narrative articulated by the Commission was to 'create a single market for Apart from the Commission's initial presentation of the CMU project, its main public pronouncements on the importance of CMU in terms of improving the competitiveness of the European financial sector took place in the UK or in specific financial fora (see Table 1 ). In
Commission print media interviews and articles on CMU, competitiveness was emphasised above all in the UK press and financial sector trade magazines. In Germany and France, only a small section of the press -that directed to business, including Les Echos in France 3 -emphasised positively the competitiveness objectives of the project in interviews with the Commission. These newspapers also emphasised the SME and infrastructure finance dimension.
Despite the Commission's focus on improving the competitiveness of all EU financial centres, the concern about the EU's global competitiveness was much higher in the UK (e.g. Table 1 ).
The policy narrative on the provision of (non-bank) funding to the real economy
The second policy narrative focused upon the provision of (non-bank) funding to the real economy, especially to SMEs and infrastructural projects. The starting point of the narrative was the low economic growth in the EU in the aftermath of the international financial and sovereign debt crises and the limited amount of (bank intermediated) funding available to the real economy. On its webpages and in regular communications on CMU, the Commission argued that bank lending in the EU accounted for an excessively large percentage of total funding to the real economy (75-80 per cent), which was the reverse of the US, 4 where banks provided only 20 per cent (Commission 2015a) and exposed large parts of the EU economy to a credit crunch in the aftermath of the crisis. The development of EU capital markets offered a solution.
The Commission also presented securitisation as necessary to 'unlocking bank lending' by diversifying funding sources (Commission 2015a). An activist push by the Commission was considered necessary in order to tackle the bad reputation in the EU faced by securitisation, which had more than halved following the international financial crisis. In its explanatory document for the draft legislation on securitisation, the Commission (2015c) distinguished between the massive losses on securitised products sold by US banks and the very small losses on securitised products in the EU. The Commission (2015c: 10, 11) promised a new 'simple, transparent and standardised securitisation'.
In articulating this policy narrative, the Commission was keen not to alienate the support of or to attract the opposition of the banking sector, and thus CMU was presented as 'complementing the role of banks' . Indeed, in a joint letter in July 2015, the French and German finance ministers stressed the need 'to ensure a level playing field between the various capital and bank based financial instruments' and that 'banks should be an integral part of consideration in this respect' (Schäuble and Sapin 2015: 2) . To this end, the Commission committed to undertake a review of existing legislation in order to evaluate the cumulative effects of post crisis legislation on banks and other financial players in the EU. In so doing, the Commission also sought to address the calls by the UK, and the bulk of the EU's financial industry to 'simplify and streamline' EU financial legislation. For example, the UK authorities and almost all the financial industry firms and associations that responded to the consultation made reference to the EU's 'better regulation' agenda.
A systematic review of CMU-focused speeches, interviews and articles by high ranking
Commission officials (notably Lord Hill) in Germany and France demonstrates the relative importance attached to emphasising the benefits of CMU (and, specifically, facilitated securitisation) to SMEs and / or infrastructural firms (see Table 1 ). In France, Lord Hill gave two main policy speeches on CMU: one to a gathering of bankers and one to the wider public with the participation of the then French finance minister, Michel Sapin. In the first speech, Hill emphasised the beneficial impact of CMU for (large universal) banks and the financial sector more generally. In the second speech -which took place at a medium-sized upon the potential contribution of CMU to the diversification and improvement of SMEfinance. 5 Lord Hill's CMU-focused speeches and interviews in Germany -apart from those made specifically to the association representing private sector banks -were similarly focused on improved financing opportunities for SMEs and infrastructural projects. 6 Despite the significant impact of the credit crunch in the UK on SMEs, Lord Hill's presentation of the CMU project in the UK normally side-lined the SME finance dimension with the partial exception of an April 2015 speech to a Reuters Newsmakers' Event which focused on both dimensions of the project. Table 1 Table 1 demonstrate the use of these two policy narratives in different national contexts and economic interest fora. In the UK and to financial interests, the Commission stressed the contribution of CMU to financial sector competitiveness and opportunities for finance. In Finally, an interesting research agenda stems from these findings both theoretically and, more practically, for policy. Theoretically, it would be important to investigate why the Commission and its narratives are influential in certain policy areas, such as in the case of CMU, while in other areas they are not, as in the case of Banking Union. As for the policy debate, the political economy effects of CMU and distributional conflicts will become clearer once additional legislative measures are negotiated and implemented. Hence, future research could investigate whether the influence of the Commission through its strategic use of narratives will continue once these additional pieces of legislation are proposed and negotiated.
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